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CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT AS A CONFLICT OF
LAWS PROBLEM
Philip Shuchman*
In seven states the judgment note or so-called "cognovit instruments,"
containing a warrant to confess judgment against the debtor, is in common
use.' The contract permits an action in debt, assumpsit or contract resulting
in an immediate judgment without prior suit or service upon the debtor or
maker of the instrument. Sometimes judgment may be confessed at or shortly
after execution of the note as additional security for a loan or other extension
of credit3 whether or not any money is then owing;4 more often the instrument
permits the entry of judgment only after default.' In either case there has been
a submission in advance to the jurisdiction of the court of rendition; often
running to any court in the United States.'
Ordinarily an attorney of the creditor's choosing enters his appearance
pro forma for the debtor and confesses a judgment against him, which, for
most purposes, is a final adjudication.7 Several jurisdictions absolutely prohibit
the use of the judgment note, deeming any such contract stipulation void as
against local public policy;8 others provide criminal penalties for violation of
A.B., LL.B., M.A; member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
1 Delaware, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin. See Note,
Confessions of judgments, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 524, 525 (1954).
2 See, e.g., Tanner, Uniformity of Judgment Notes in Pennsylvania, 44 Dicx. L. REV.
173 (1940); Hunter, The Warrant of Attorney to Confess Judgment, 8 OHIO ST. L.J. 1
(1941).
3 See Annot., 3 A.L.R. 851 (1919).
4 See, e.g., Mellon v. Ritz, 332 Pa. 97, 2 A.2d 699 (1938); Harwood v. Bruhn, 313 Pa.
337, 170 At. 144 (1934).
5 Such notes are generally negotiable instruments both under the UNIFORm COMMERCIAL
CODE § 3-112 (1) (d) and the UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 5 (2).
6 See, e.g., Oberlin v. Parry, 287 Pa. 224, 134 Atl. 460 (1926), Annot., 155 A.L.R.
921, 923 (1945); First National Bank of Athens v. Garland, 109 Mich. 515, 67 N.W. 559
(1896).
7 Kieda v. Krull, 101 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1939); Pennsylvania Co. v. Watt, 151 F.2d
697 (5th Cir. 1945).
8 A listing of those states is given in Note, Confessions of Judgments, 102 U. PA. L. REv.
524 (1954).
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the statute.' Some jurisdictions prohibit the confession of judgment as a mat-
ter of local practice. Frequently where statutes prohibit the confession of judg-
ment, the courts regard it as a procedural device," which need not be herein
further considered because it is generally agreed that the law of the place
where the judgment is sought to be confessed should control the availability
of judgment as a remedy. Such an interpretation does not prevent the local
execution of cognovit instruments where judgment is to be confessed or per-
formance made in other states which permit the practice; but merely precludes
the exercise of the power to confess judgment within that state, no matter where
executed."
Where there is a prohibition of the stipulation authorizing confession of
judgment in the note, that involves the validity of the contract itself which
must be determined by reference to the law which, for other purposes of con-
tract validity, is regarded as proper at the forumY Thus the examination
of such provisions entails an examination of the law of contracts in the conflict
of laws generally.
Public policy of forum
Although there is little question but that even an explicitly stated public
policy in the forum against the cause of action which gave rise to the judgment
cannot prevail as a defense to a judgment lawfully taken elsewhere,"3 it is fairly
patent that state courts in such jurisdictions have stretched the conflict of laws
rules and the full faith and credit clause in several inconsistent directions to
achieve the invalidation of judgment taken by confession elsewhere.
Merger of cause of action in the judgment
Moreover, the possibility that the illegal cause of action (the judgment
note invalid by the law of the state where executed or to be performed) would
be merged in the judgment and the cause of action thereby rendered immune
to attack 4 has been precluded by the decisions which, while holding the validity
of the judgment claim not open to inquiry, except for fraud and payment, do
permit examination of the jurisdiction of the court of rendition. 5 And where
judgment is confessed on an invalid warrant, it is, in legal effect, deemed to
be a personal judgment without personal service and without the appearance
of the defendants in person or by an authorized attorney; hence lacking an
adequate jurisdictional basis. In sum, it is a judgment rendered without due
9 Indiana, IND. STAT. ANN. § 2-2906 (1946); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-9-18
(1953).
10 See, e.g., McDade v. Moynihan, 330 Mass. 437, 115 N.E.2d 372 (1953); Gotham
Credit Corp. v. Powell, 22 N.J. Misc. 301, 38 A.2d 700 (1944); Albert B. &. L. Ass'n v.
Newman, 224 N.Y. Supp. 386 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
11 Cf. Comment, 29 MICH. L. REv. 105 (1930).
12 Cf. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 268-70 (1951).
13 Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290 (1866); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S.
230 (1908).
14 Cf. Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282, 291 (1939); Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252
U.S. 411, 415 (1920); Picking v. Local Loan Co., 185 Md. 264, 44 A.2d 462 (1945).
15 See, e.g., Milwaukee County v. White 'Co. 296 U.S. 268, 275 (1935); National Ex-
change Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257, 268 (1904).
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process of law.' In the case of the cognovit instrument, application of the law
of the state of execution or performance may sometimes not only invalidate
the contract which constitutes the cause of action (or at least that portion
which is the remedy granted the creditors) but that step has the extraterritorial
effect of divesting any other court of jurisdiction to render the judgment by
confession notwithstanding express contract provisions to the contrary.
Since the United States Supreme Court has spoken often and forcefully
in favor of the "intention" theory 7 where federal questions are involved and
since it is clear that an illegal and even a void cause of action in one state can
give rise to a cause of action resulting in judgment in another state to which
the first state must offer full faith and credit,' 8 it is curious that these states
have been permitted to deny full faith and credit to judgments entered by con-
fession solely on the ground that since the cognovit instrument was invalid
where executed, (or where it is to be performed) it cannot be the basis of a
lawful judgment rendered elsewhere. Clearly the denial of full faith and credit
involves a federal question, for a state court has refused credit to the judgment
of a sister state, in reality because of its opinion of the nature of the cause
of action and the judgment in which it is merged. A federal right, it has been
held, is thereby denied and the sufficiency of the grounds of denial are for the
Supreme Court finally to decide.'"
Where the entire cause of action resulting in the judgment is unlawful
because arising out of a gambling debt,"0 or clearly barred by the statute of
limitations before the judgment was procured,2 the forum cannot withhold
full faith and credit from the judgment rendered in another state2 Yet the
policy of the forum, which is usually the debtor's domicile, is by no means
less contravened in these cases than in the execution of a judgment note in
the ordinary course of business2 Of course, it can be hypothesized that in
fact no cause of action has been created by the making of a judgment note
where prohibited by statute. But since these very states do not ordinarily impair
the obligation itself, merely eradicating part of the remedy, 4 it is patent that
some cause of action has been created; an obligation, the performance of which
can be otherwise compelled, exists.
The United States Supreme Court has not yet considered these questions,
but that strict observance of the terms of a warrant of attorney to confess
judgment will result in a judgment entitled to full faith and credit seems a
conclusion warranted by the two decisions of the Court bearing on the matter.2
16 Cf. National Exchange Bank v. Wiley, supra note 15 at 268.
17 See Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 137 (1882); cf. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S.
571, 588-89 (1953).
18 Op. cit. supra note 14.
19 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943); Titus v. Wallick, supra
note 14, at 291.
20 Fauntleroy v. Lum, supra note 13.
21 Christmas v. Russell, supra note 13; but cf. Brown v. Parker, 28 Wis. 21 (1871),
Annot., 21 A.L.R. 774, 776-77 (1922).
22 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, supra note 19 at 439.
23 Cf. Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, supra note 14 at 415.
24 See Partial Invalidation, infra.
25 Grover & Baker Machine Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287 (1890); National Exchange
Bank v. Wiley, supra note 15; cf. 'Comment, Full Faith and Credit for Judgments Confessed
by Attorney, 44 HRv. L. Rxv. 1275, 1281 (1931).
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Certainly the Supreme Court has set a rigid standard of full faith and credit26
which makes it doubtful that such practices at the forum can be upheld."
Presently, many of the problems presented to those using cognovit instru-
ments are in the conflict of laws area, where, notwithstanding the constitutional
admonition, various contract theories in the conflict of laws are used to uphold
local public policy of the forum, evidenced by restrictive and frequently pro-
hibitive legislation regarding the confession of judgment.
At least three inconsistent theories relating to contracts which include
confession of judgment clauses are commonly found.
Place of contracting
Under this theory, the place of execution of the contract, as in the general
conflict of laws rules, is determinative of its essential validity. Given the views
of the Restatement,28 Beale"9 and probably of most of the jurisdictions which
have passed on the matter"0 if the law of the place where the contract is made
gives it no legal validity, then no other law has the power to create a binding
obligation.3" Although the Restatement of Judgments does provide for jurisdic-
tion by consent given in cognovit instruments, nothing is there said of the possible
contract prohibition and invalidation in the state where the contract is executed.3
Under this rule, then, if cognovit clauses are void where the judgment
note is made, the contract is invalid everywhere, and a judgment confessed
thereon was rendered without proper jurisdiction in the court of rendition.
Since the jurisdiction of the court out of which the judgment issued is always
open to question, under the full faith and credit clause, the examination of the
validity of the original contract can result in the denial of the plaintiff's claim
in a suit upon the confessed judgment.
As various critics have pointed out, the place of contracting may be for-
tuitous, or in any of several ways an entirely insignificant factor as between
parties who are not residents of the state of contracting. The often accidental
location of the last "act" or the "principal event" is a frequent difficulty;33 nor
is there necessarily a single such locale. And the peculiarity of the situation
where the law of the forum decides where the contract was legally executed so
as to determine the applicable law has been aptly criticized as a legalistic
finesse defying common sense. 4 The "place of contracting" theory has the
inherent defect of the prior need to know the last act necessary for a binding
26 Fauntleroy v. Lum, supra note 13.
27 Cf. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 197 (1959).
28 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934); see Wilensky v. Miller, 257 Wis. 589,
44 N.W.2d 521 (1950).
29 ". . . the effect of illegality . . . is to be determined by the law of the place of con-
tracting. If that law makes the contract itself illegal, of course, it is void everywhere." 2
BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1227 (1935) (hereinafter cited as BEALE). But see 2 BEALE,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 1230 for what may be a qualification in regard to cognovit instruments.
30 Cf. Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 544, 547 (1951).
31 Cf. Coox, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 348 (1942).
32 RESTATEIENT, JUDGMENTS § 18, Comment (e) (1942).
33 See Note, Party Autonomy in Contracts, 57 COLUM. L. Rav. 553, 568 (1957).
34 2 RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 461 (1937) (hereinafter cited as RABEL). In
Loudonville Milling Co. v. Davis, 248 Ala. 202, 27 So. 2d 6 (1946), it was found as a fact
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agreement which can only be known after it is known which law is to de-
termine the acts that are necessary for the creation of the contract." Even
staunch advocates of the "place of contracting" rule admit that its consistent
application is often apt to frustrate the intention of the parties;"8 and this is
especially true where both parties expressly agree on the application of a certain
law in commercial loan contracts involving the use of cognovit instruments.
Place of performance
Unquestionably the warrant of attorney to confess judgment relates to the
remedy given the creditor and, when exercised, is a procedural matter; hence
some commentators and jurists have taken the view that although the substan-
tive validity of the obligation is to be determined by the law of the place of
execution, the power or warrant of attorney should ordinarily be governed by
the law of the place where performance, i.e, payment, is to take place." With
a nod in the direction of the autonomy of the contracting parties regarding
their intent in the choice of applicable law, judgments taken by confession are
deemed valid or not depending on the stipulated place of payment."
It is probably true that in many cases the place of performance is more
significant to the contracting parties than the place of contracting, if any such
single place there be. But the place of performance may be equally accidental
or insignificant as a basis for choice of the applicable law. 9 It is also clear that
where bilateral contracts are involved, or multiple-state performance, the test
of the law of the place of performance "fails to work in a frequently encountered
and important class of cases."4 Because the forms used by the major lending
and credit institutions are often drawn with a view toward the law of their
domiciles, the cognovit clause, if included, is generally valid at the stipulated
place of payment. Here it is fairly certain that at least one of the contracting
parties had the law of the place of performance in mind. If the "place of per-
formance" theory were consistently followed, the validity of judgments taken
by confession might be a simple matter to insure by providing for payment in
a jurisdiction which permits such entry of judgment. But this is a minority
view, not sufficiently available even where a single and exclusive place of per-
formance does exist.
that the judgment note was "executed" in Alabama although it had been delivered to the
plaintiff in Ohio and accepted there. The decision went so far as to construe the statutory
prohibition against "execution" within the state as synonymous with "signed." See 8 ALA.
LAWYER 178 (1947).
35 EHRENZWEIG, CONTRACTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 59 COLUM. L. Rv. 973, 986
(1959).
36 GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 323 (1949) (hereinafter cited
as GOODRICH).
37 3 FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS 1314 (1925) suggests that the parties had the law of
such place in mind "though of course the circumstances or contract may sufficiently indicate
that the parties had some other law in mind"; 2 BEALE 1230; cf. Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 544,
546 (1951).
38 South Orange Trust Co. v. Barrett, 45 Del. 533, 76 A.2d 310 (1950); Vennum v.
Mertens, 119 Mo. App. 461, 95 S.W. 292 (1906); Krantz v. Katzenstein, 22 Pa. Super Ct.
275 (1903); cf. Hastings v. Bushong, 252 S.W. 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Comment,
MICH. L. Rlv. 105 (1930).




Strange cases can arise under both theories. Given that an Alabama statute
makes void any cognovit instrument executed in that state,4" if a debtor in
Alabama signs a judgment note there and then personally travels to Ohio and
delivers the signed note to his creditor in Ohio, could an Alabama court hold
the judgment confessed in Ohio void merely because the instrument was signed
in Alabama?42
Consider the situation where a lender in Florida has a judgment note
executed in Florida providing for payment in Pennsylvania. The borrower is
a Pennsylvania resident and has realty there on which a confessed judgment
would be a lien. Given the usual broad form of authority, judgment could be
confessed upon the cognovit instrument in Pennsylvania and a valid judgment
upon which local execution could issue thereby created; but that same judg-
ment would be void in Florida, and not accorded full faith and credit."
Florida determines the validity of contracts by the place of execution"
and Pennsylvania by the place of performance if designated. Hence, it is quite
possible, notwithstanding the explicit intent and purpose of the parties, that
the confessed judgment in Pennsylvania would not only be void in Florida but,
as a result, questionable in Pennsylvania as well, given proof of Florida law
in the courts of Pennsylvania as the forum. 6 Most likely the judgment would
be valid in Pennsylvania and not constitute a deprivation of due process.
Moreover, the citizen of Florida has received no protection whatever, a situa-
tion which would similarly obtain where both parties to the cognovit instrument
were merely vacationing in Florida and happened to transact this particular
business there.
Can it be reasonably said that two Ohio residents temporarily in Alabama
should not have the law of Ohio control their transaction where that is both
the state of performance and the situs of the security?48 Or even where both
the latter factors are lacking as e.g., where payment may be made at any office
of the lender in any of several states? No citizen of Alabama has been accorded
any protection.
Had the loser in the gambling transaction, which is the subject matter
of Fauntleroy v. Lum, 9 given the winner a judgment note to secure payment
where Mississippi prohibits the confession of judgment" and makes such agree-
ments void, could it have been held, consistent with the constitutional mandate,
that the judgment confessed thereon in a state permitting such practice would
not have been entitled to full faith and credit in Mississippi? If the unlawful
41 ALA. CODE tit. 20, § 16 (1940).
42 See Loudonville Milling Co. v. Davis, supra note 34; Monarch Refrigerating Co. v.
Faulk, 228 Ala. 554, 155 So. 74 (1934) ; cf. 8 ALA. LAWYER 182 (1947).
43 Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1887); Grover & Baker Machine Co. v. Radcliffe,
137 U.S. 287 (1890).
44 Pearson v. Friedman, 112 So. 2d 894 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
45 Krantz v. Katzenstein, supra note 38.
46 Cf. Oberlin v. Parry, 287 Pa. 224, 134 Atl. 460 (1926).
47 Cf. Grover & Baker Machine Co. v. Radcliffe, supra note 43.
48 Cf. Coox 405-06.
49 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
50 Miss. CODE ANN. § 1545 (1942).
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cause of action in Fauntleroy v. Lum gave rise to a judgment which the Supreme
Court held was entitled to full faith and credit in Mississippi, can the addition
of a procedural remedy for the creditor make such a difference? It is a strange
doctrine that does not permit the examination of the illegal consideration which
gave rise to the judgment, but permits invalidation of the judgment merely
because of a remedy given the creditor. But such is the conflict of laws rule
which holds the law of the place of contracting determinative. And was it not
true in Fauntleroy v. Lum that both the "place of contracting" and the "place
of performance" was Mississippi, where the contract was void and that even
the judgment recovered for the express purpose of evading the Mississippi law
invalidating the contract was held entitled to full faith and credit?"'
Partial invalidation
But it is generally true that a contract is not rendered entirely unenforce-
able because it contains a warrant of attorney authorizing the confession of
judgment and is executed or to be performed in (depending upon the conflict
of laws rule of the forum) a state which, because of public policy, prohibits
such contract provisions.52 The validity of the contract is not otherwise impaired;
the cognovit clause is merely 'disregarded if not utilized as a remedy. " The
prohibitory or restrictive statutes, sometimes penal, are strictly construed and
not deemed to operate a forfeiture of the creditor's rights. 4 If the contract is
otherwise enforceable, i.e., if the rights claimed can be established without the
cognovit clause, the right of recovery on the contract is unaffected as regards
an action on the obligation,55 for the cognovit clause is held separable without
invalidating the rest of the contract." Such suit will be permitted in the first
instance5 ' and even after the failure of a suit in the forum on the judgment
confessed in another state permitting the practice," although it has been indi-
cated that the cognovit may not be separable for all purposes;5" and, in fact,
there is strong dicta that a cognovit note executed in Indiana is entirely void
because of the statutory prohibition of the place of contracting.6"
51 Cf. Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 973, 1013
(1959).
52 See Annot., III A.L.R. 1407 (1937).
53 Cf. 6 CoaRBN ON CONTRACTS, § 1527 (1950).
54 Simpson v. Fuller, 119 Ind. App. 583, 51 N.E.2d 870 (1943).
55 Phrend v. Midwest Engineering Co., 93 Ind. App. 165, 177 N.E. 879 (1931); Sales-
Davis Co. v. Henderson-Boyd Lumber Co., 193 Ala. 166, 69 So. 527 (1915).
56 Simpson v. Fuller, supra at note 54.
57 American Furniture Mart Bldg. Corp. v. W. C. Redmon, Sons & Co., 210 Ind. 112,
1 N.E.2d 606 (1936); cf. Paulasky v. Polish Roman Catholic Union, 219 Ind. 441, 39 N.E.2d
440, 444 (1942) cognovit provision deleted prior to the commencement of suit; Kiernan v.
Jackson, 111 La. 645, 35 So. 798 (1904).
58 Loudonville Milling Co. v. Davis, 248 Ala, 202, 27 So. 2d 6 (1946), in which demurrer
was sustained to complaint based on judgment entered by confession in Ohio. The court
indicated by dicta that the warrant of attorney to confess judgment was, in legal effect, sep-
arate and distinct from the obligation and, at 251 Ala. 459, 37 So. 2d 659 (1948), recovery
was permitted in a suit brought directly on the note in Alabama.
59 W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417, 419 (1945).
60 Phrommer v. Albers, 106 Ind. App. 548, 21 N.E.2d 72 (1939); Fodor v. Popp, 93
Ind. App. 429, 178 N.E. 695 (1931); but cf. Peoples National B. & T. 'Co. v. Pora, 212 Ind.
468, 473, 9 N.E.2d 83 (1937).
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Intent
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws6 entirely overlooks the problem of
the illegality of the cognovit instrument where executed (which is usually where
enforcement of the judgment entered by confession is sought); the Restatement
of Judgments 2 abdicates itself from consideration of the problem with the
comment that "it is not within the scope of the Restatement of this subject to
state the extent to which a power of attorney to confess judgment may be illegal,
or to state the effect of such illegality in States other than that in which it is
given."6
But the United States Supreme Court64 and most of the commentators s
have generally agreed that the parties to a contract have the right to determine
by agreement the law applicable to their contract; only the perameters of such
agreements may be unclear.66 In that connection, most advocates of the "inten-
tion" theory accede to the limitation that the choice of applicable law be such
as has a reasonable or substantial connection with the contract or the under-
lying transaction. Cook suggests that the reason for the requirement is simply
the practical need to preclude an inconvenient burden on the court of the forum
which would result if a wider choice were given." The limitation of expressed
intent to those states having a substantial connection is probably a sufficient
answer to the frequent charges of evasion of some local or otherwise "improper"
law; the choice so limited will generally satisfy the requirement that the choice
of other law be bona fide.6"
But in cognovit instruments the courts considering the matter ordinarily
infer intent from the stipulated place of payment" or from the surrounding
circumstances;7" or by examination of the so-called contact points or center of
61 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 81 (1934).
62 RESTATEMENT, JUDGIENTS § 18 (1942).
63 Id. at § 18(e).
64 Cf. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U.S.
551 (1904); Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124 (1882).
65 See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 973
(1959); Note, Choice of Law Rules for .. . Written Instruments, 72 HAnv. L. REv. 1154,
1164 (1959).
66 2 RABEL 363.
67 "... authorities have required... that the intention of the parties to select a law must
be confined within certain limits .. . courts have said that an agreement of the parties to
chogse a law should be made with a bona fide intent, not fictitious, based on a normal relation,
or a natural and vital connection": CooK 418; cf. 2 RABEL 402. Harper questions whether the
logic of the situation is consistent with any limitation of the "intention" rule. "If the courts are
willing to allow the parties to select their own law, why should it be necessary that they select
the law of a state which has some factual connection with their bargain. . . .Actually, the
limitation of the rule argues for its abandonment. If it be important that the state whose law is
to govern the contract have some factual connection with it, why should the contract not be
governed by the law of the state which has the most significant factual connection therewith?"
68 Cf. Levin, Party Autonomy: Choice of Law Clauses in Commercial Contracts, 46
GEo. L.J. 260, 263 (1957).
69 South Orange Trust Co. v. Barrett, 45 Del. 533, 76 A.2d 310 (1950); but cf. Spahr
v. P. & H. Supply Co., 223 Ind. 59, 63 N.E.2d 425 (1945), where although the judgment
note was payable in Indiana, the forum deemed it an Ohio contract because executed in Ohio.
In the other cases cited, the Delaware and Missouri courts might have held the judgment
invalid by application of Indiana law.
70 Cf. Acme Feeds, Inc. v. Berg, 231 Iowa 1271, 4 N.W.2d 430, 432 (1942), although
the contract was apparently completed in Illinois, which permits the confession of judgment.
CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT
gravity of the contract.71 In yet other cases a determination of fact is made
regarding the intended law of the parties, usually as a basis for invalidation"2
although a Kentucky court found that the parties intended Illinois law to
govern in part because the remedy provided for (confession of judgment) was
peculiar to Illinois and not recognized in Kentucky.73
Lenders have long attempted to impose their own choice of law by con-
tract provision; but it is said that analysis of the cases reveals that courts, even
while subscribing to party autonomy in contracts, have consistently refused to
accept the choice, probably because of the adhesion contract aspect of such
transactions; 4 certainly that has been true to a significant extent.
Many contractual stipulations serve as devices for determining the ap-
plicable law in advance of the selection of the forum by such provisions as
that the contract is deemed to have been made at the domicile of the lender
or seller, or that the agreement is not a binding contract until accepted by the
lender or seller at its office. Rabel views these stipulations as a tribute to the
historical rule of the lex locus contractus.5 Some jurisdictions avowedly permit
the choice of law as a matter of party autonomy notwithstanding the evidence
by statute of a strong public policy against cognovit instruments.7 0 The Uni-
form Commercial Code, with few exceptions, explicitly provides for agreement on
the choice of law when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to another state.
77
Certain it is that domestic conflicts law has elements of uncertainty in
commercial matters which effectively hamper credit transactions in interstate
commerce. One" improved resolution of the conflict of laws problems in the
use of cognovit instruments is the increased use of express stipulations by the
parties regarding the applicable and proper law of their contracts.
71 Cf. W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, supra note 59; see Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155,
123 N.E.2d 99 (1954) for a discussion of the "grouping of contacts" theory.
72 Cf. Bernard Bloeckler Co. v. Baker Co., 52 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932);
Paulasky v. Polish Roman Catholic Union, supra note 57, where the court felt that notwith-
standing execution and performance in Illinois, the parties must have contemplated that
foreclosure proceedings would be at the situs of the realty, Indiana, and hence intended suit
to be subject to the laws of Indiana. ...... upon a reading of the cases, (one) cannot escape the
feeling that whenever it seems important enough to do so, the intention of the parties is so
determined as to preclude the application of a foreign rule which is disapproved at the
forum." STUMBERO 236.
73 Wedding v. First National Bank of Chicago, 280 Ky. 610, 133 S.W.2d 931 (1939).
The judgment note was delivered in Illinois and provided for payment there as well. The
view embodied in this case makes intention determinative of the applicable law and that inten-
tion is found in the implicit recitation of the instrument used. In Pritchard v. Norton, supra
note 64, the Supreme Court similarly felt that "the parties cannot be presumed to have con-
templated a law which would defeat their engagements."
74 Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 59 COLUm. L. REV. 973, 976-77 (1959).
75 2 RAnEL 380. Other examples are there given.
76 See, e.g., Mountain States Fixture Co. v. Daskalos, 61 N.M. 491, 303 P.2d 698 (1956);
Gotham Credit Corp. v. Powell, 22 N.J. Misc. 301, 38 A.2d 700 (1944). Both the cited
cases involve another jurisdiction with a substantial connection.
77 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105 (1) (1958). Hence, with the limitation that a
reasonable relation is required, six states permit the expressed intent of the parties to govern
(Conn., Ky., Mass., N.H., Pa. and R.I.).
78 See Note, Commercial Security and Uniformity through Express Stipulations as to
Governing Law, 62 HAv. L. REv. 647, 648 (1949), indicating at 649 that an analysis of
the cases and references to leading authorities shows a definite "tendency toward acceptance
of express stipulations when shown to be commercially reasonable and in furtherance of busi-
ness convenience or necessity." See Annot., 112 A.L.R. 124 (1938) for a survey of the then
validity and effect of such stipulations.
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Contacts rule
Most recently the so-called "grouping of contacts" or "center of gravity"
theory has been more broadly applied and as to judgment notes it has been sug-
gested that the court of the forum "consider all acts of the parties touching the
transaction in relation to the several states involved and . . . apply as the law
governing the transaction the law of that state with which the facts are in most
intimate contact.""
It has been granted that this theory affords less certainty and predictability
than the other rules8" and the suggestion, probably well taken, has been made
that in practice the courts utilizing this theory tend toward application of the
law of the forum with which they are best acquainted.8 It is questionable
whether the determination of the proper law can reasonably be made in most
of the cases involving judgments taken by confession on cognovit instruments
and whether, in commercial transactions the paramount control of the state,
if ascertainable, "having the most interest in the problem"' is more desirable
than a broad theory of validation based on a presumed intent that the parties'
acts are intended to be binding.
Since the denial of full faith and credit involves the deprivation of a con-
stitutional right, presumably the Supreme Court should be the final arbiter
of the effect given to judgments taken by confession. That court has not yet
considered the problem of the validity of a judgment rendered by confession
on an instrument invalid by the law of any of the places deemed determinative
of validity by the several theories applied. Resolution of the problem by the
application of the law of the place of most significant contact(s) may well be
held an unconstitutional denial of full faith and credit to the confessed judg-
ment, for the court has rather consistently accepted the expressed intent of the
parties as determinative of the applicable law.
It has aptly been pointed out that this most recent formula is an implicit
admission of the failure and lack of legal viability of the prior theories. 2
Judgment notes as adhesion contracts
The suggestion that statutes prohibiting the execution of instruments con-
taining cognovit clauses and rendering them void are essentially protective
rules to assist borrowers when the parties to the contract have unequal bar-
gaining power83 is implicit in many of the statutes and decisions. Such so-
called adhesion contracts are "agreements in which one party's participation
consists in his mere adherence, unwilling and often unknowing, to a document
drafted unilaterally and insisted upon by what is usually a powerful enter-
prise."84 Professor Ehrenzweig's view is that the principle of party autonomy
(either a total or a limited choice of applicable law by the contracting parties)
79 w. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945).
80 Cf. Auten v. Auten, supra note 71.
81 Levin, Party Autonomy: Choice of Law Clauses in Commercial Contracts, 46 GEo.
L.J. 260, 268 (1957).
82 Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 59 COLUm. L. REv. 973, 985 (1959).
83 Cf. Cheatham, Book Review, 48 CoLu r. L. REv. 1268, 1269 (1948).
84 Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 1072,
1075 (1953).
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has no place in adhesion contracts.8 5 Another recent view goes so far as to
advocate a presumption of adhesion and against the validity of such contracts
where the decisive factor is one of the choice of applicable law." And it is
probably true that where lenders have attempted to impose their own choice
of law by means of printed or "form" contracts, the courts have fairly consis-
tently struck down such stipulations in adhesion contracts. 7
It may well be desirable as a matter of public policy to protect the bor-
rower who either signs the c6ntract provided or gets no loan and some juris-
dictions, in furtherance of that view, prohibit small loan and consumer finance
companies from using judgment notes. 8
But the statutes and interpretive cases invalidating cognovit instruments
and the judgments confessed thereon from the standpoint of the law of the
place of contracting or of performance, make no distinction between those
borrowers who have exercised the "spurious freedom to adhere" and those
whose bargaining power is more nearly equal to that of the lender.8" Both
purport to be merely logical applications of slightly different conceptions based
on the theory of territoriality. The purpose of one such statute has been stated
to be the protection of the citizens of that state "from the evil of having judg-
ments confessed against them."9
Under the territorial theory of the place of contracting rule, the cognovit
instrument would be invalid even if both borrower and lender were residents
of other states. No factual analysis of the underlying transaction is made in
the invalidations of cognovit instruments and the judgments confessed thereon.
If the adhesion contract is really a form of coercion, there may exist no need
for other means of achieving the presumably desirable goal of invalidation.
The place of contracting or of performance; the residence of the debtor and
the situs of the security, etc., are irrelevant facts if it is taken that the creditor-
debtor relationship constitutes sufficient restraint. If there is no tenable theory
of duress, the excuses underlying the invalidation of adhesion contracts are not
well founded. 9'
It has been commented that the statutory rights of commercial creditors
are more readily waived or bargained away than those given mere debtors.92
Certainly the determination when an adhesion contract is before the court
would not only be extremely difficult, but rather than create a situation of
security and relative certainty in commercial transactions, a mild chaos would
be apt to result.
85 Ibid.
86 Note, Party Autonomy in Contracts, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 553, 575 (1957).
87 Cf. Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 59 COLUM. L. Rxv. 973, 976-77
(1959); but cf. Mountain States Fixture Co. v. Daskalos, supra note 76; Gotham Credit
Corp. v. Powell, supra note 76.
88 See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 288.200 (1955).
89 Some jurisdictions prohibit corporations from interposing the defense of usury on the
ground-often unjustified in fact- that corporations do not require the protection given to
other debtors. See e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAws § 374; Pa. Bus. Corp. Law § 313; Ill. Rev. Stat.
c. 74, § 4.
90 Peoples National B. & T. Co. v. Pora, supra note 60.
91 Cf. Comment, Full Faith and Credit for Judgments Confessed by Attorney, 44 HAv.
L. REv. 1275 (1931).
92 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 983 (1950).
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Federal jurisdiction
As is apparent by the conflicting theories in practice, the use by credit
or lending institutions of judgment notes often presents considerable difficulty
and uncertainty if the transaction takes place in more than one state. As one
possible solution, if the jurisdictional requirements are met, judgment may be
confessed in the federal district court and, if necessary, later registered in any
other federal district court, where it will have the same effect as a judgment
rendered by the court in which registered." Unlike the situation as between
the state courts,9" such a judgment need not be sued upon in the court where
registered.
The federal courts consider that jurisdiction can be granted by consent
given prior to the bringing of an action as provided for in the usual form of
judgment note and that the entire matter of the confession of judgment is one
of procedure governed by the federal rules." Some local rules of the federal
district courts provide for the confession of judgment;" the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not preclude the entry of judgment by confession on a
proper warrant of attorney." Such process was early permitted in the various
federal courts" and there seems to be no objection now raised.9 Although
it does not appear that the confession of judgment has occurred in federal dis-
trict courts situated in states which prohibit such practice, there is no procedural
impediment noted in the decisions. Presumably the federal courts will apply
as proper the law stipulated as determinative by the parties since the Supreme
Court has followed the "intention" theory.
There are few recent cases evidencing confessions of judgment in the federal
courts which may indicate that this resolution of the problem is of too limited
an application because of the jurisdictional requirements involved.
"'A modest proposal"
It is suggested that "the problems in the conflict of laws in the field of
contracts need to be broken down into groups, so that different types of social,
economic and business problems may receive separate consideration" ;... for it
is apparent that broad and sweeping rules will not solve the problems and that
93 Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 958, 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1948).
94 "No execution can issue upon such judgment (in another state) without a new suit
and they enjoy not the right of priority, or privilege, or lien, which they have in the
state where they are pronounced, but that only, which the Lex Fori gives to them by its own
laws in their character of foreign judgments." STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAws 1005 (1846). The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act does not alter this
history as regards judgments obtained by confession, for the Act defines a foreign judgment as
"any judgment .. . of a court of the United States which is entitled to full faith and credit in
this state," thereby begging the questions ordinarily raised.
95 Bowles v. J. J. Schmitt & Co., Inc., 170 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1948).
96 See, e.g., Rule 28, M.D. Pa.; Rule 39, E.D. Pa.
97 F.D.I.C. v. Steinman, 53 F. Supp. 644, 651 (E.D. Pa. 1943); cf. 10 CYc. OF FEDERAL
PROCEDURE 35.26 (3d ed. 1953).
98 See, e.g., George D. Harter Bank v. Straus, 170 F. 489 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1909); Smith
v. Hartwell, 4 McLean 206, Fed. Cas. (No. 13054) (O.C.D. Ill. 1847); Fairchild v. Camac,
3 Wash. C.C. 558, Fed. Cas. (No. 4610) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1819).
99 Hadden v. Rumsey Products, Inc., 196 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1952), the confession of
judgment took place in the U.S. District Court in Ohio, F.D.I.C. v. Steinman, supra note 97.
100 COOK 419.
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the issues are both numerous and complex and best fragmented as a function
of the social and business factors involved. 1'
The conflicting public policies seem to be the protection of smaller debtors
who cannot bargain on equal terms and who, because of their inferior bargain-
ing position, should be protected from such improvident contracts as judgment
notes; and the desire for security in commercial transactions as well as the
general view that freedom of contracting should not be restricted, except for
compelling reasons; and then to the most limited extent necessary to achieve
the commonweal.
Most will agree that as between commercial debtors and creditors, the
warrant of authority to confess judgment is not a particularly onerous device.
It gives the creditor an additional quick remedy by way of greater protection
and security for his risk. And that the judgment may be entered by confession
in any court of the creditor's choice merely gives added value to the security,
as is intended."0 2
Hence aside from statutes specifically drawn to protect those debtors having
inferior bargaining positions, such as the various consumer finance laws,.0 3
all loan contracts involving cognovit clauses should be qualified by the usual
presumptions of validity unimpaired by public policy evidenced by the laws of
the place of contracting, performance, or the forum. The presumption of
essential and formal validity should obtain if any law with which the trans-
action has a reasonable contact permits the entry of judgment by confession."0
For if it is true as a matter of convenience and judicial policy that the chosen
law should have some contact with the transaction, then the usual broad form
of warrant to confess judgment in any court should be valid if judgment can
be confessed in any state with which such contact exists. The judgment so
obtained should be accorded full faith and credit in every other state. The pro-
viso should be added that if the parties do specify an applicable law by expressed
intent embodied in the agreement, that law, if it has any reasonable connection
with the transaction, should apply unless it invalidates the entire agreement.
Where there is no such expressed intent, if the form of the cognovit instrument
satisfies the law of any state with which the transaction has a reasonable con-
nection, it should be upheld by reference to and application of that law.0 5
The application of such a doctrine would effectuate more fully the expec-
tations of the parties in their negotiations and would more accurately reflect
the fact that business transactions which culminate in written agreements are,
after all, based on the premise that the agreement will be an enforceable
obligation.
101 Cf. Cheatman, Book Review, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 1267 (1948).
102 Cf. Pirie v. Conrad, 97 Wis. 150, 72 N.W. 370 (1897).
103 See BARRETT, COMPILATION OF 'CONSUMER FINANCE LAWS (1952).
104 Cf. Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 59 COLUM. -L. REv. 973, 1013
(1959).
105 Cf. STUMBERG 239.
